汉娜·阿伦特

很多人觉得女主演讲英语时的德语口音是个问题，其实是人物设计，而且我觉得挺好的。

虽然阿伦特本人讲英语并不是这样（像影片中所有的R都发成小舌音，THE RIGHT FROM THE WRONG简直惨不忍闻）。

其实苏科瓦英语非常好，网上一找一堆，要讲成这样还挺刻意难为的（毕竟她长期生活在美国），应该是人物特色的一种设计吧。

比如CH一直按德语发音这个梗，在开始的时候是朋友圈聚会，闺蜜纠正她，其他人觉得不可思议。

后来在接到主编催稿电话时，她说CHAT ON THE PHONE也依然是用她一贯的错误发音，保持了一致。

非常棒的是阿伦特书房的再现，桌后面的书柜，和能查到的照片中的家具比例几乎完全一样。

包括布吕歇那边的烟斗等等。

然后片中的60年代纽约全景、耶路撒冷街道这些场景，都很有代入感。

导演说剧中80%的对白都来自真实的文章、书信。

所以无论剧情如何设计，总体而言是非常靠谱的。

就好比影片末尾的演讲，实际上是虚拟的，但一字一句都来自她本人。

甚至关于海德格尔在她心中的位置，以及关于布吕歇（包括阿伦特自己）和他人半公开的多伴侣关系，影片也都有体现，留白恰到好处。

他们之间相互的昵称（戏称），Stup以及Frau Professor，包括一两句法语套话，都是忠实再现的细节。

以色列派Siegfried去找阿伦特的时候，阿伦特一认出对方就开始说德语，而对方开始则是说英语，外交使节嘛，而且有陪同的。。。

直到后来二人争执了才无缝切换到成德语，这个设计也是满分。

不过Hans Jonas的青年扮演者比中老年扮演者头发还稀少，可能算是一个小BUG。

苏科瓦本人已戒烟多年，为了这个角色，她恢复吸烟，然后竟然能在拍完之后又戒掉，真是太厉害了！

其实英语编剧在里面也演了一个小角色，阿伦特最后一次去看病重的 Kurt Blumenfeld 时，出门迎接她的人就是编剧Pam Katz ;-)阿伦特是我看的第二部冯·特罗塔作品，当时非常疯狂，硬头皮德语连蒙带猜看完，又找到很远的图书馆有DVD借过来，看西语字幕确认。

直到后来网上出现更多配音和原声字幕版，才有条件经常翻回去看看。

可能还有不全的，以后想到了再记。

《汉娜•阿伦特》拥有一部成熟的传记片该有的样子，冷静、内敛、完整，不做作，不花俏，抛出了一个与普罗大众都相关的问题，让阿伦特这位20世纪最具思想性的女哲学家给予了答案。

当然，这个答案与哲学一样，魅力无穷，随着思考主体和背景的不同变换着光芒。

汉娜•阿伦特被誉为20世纪最伟大、最具原创性的思想家和政治理论家之一，深受导师海德格尔的喜爱，著于二战后的《极权主义的起源》，被欧美舆论界称为大师杰作。

受胡塞尔的现象学影响，中年著有《人的境况》，以思维与行动的概念迭代古典哲学中理论与实践的概念。

作为生于德国的犹太人，二战期间开始流亡旅居生活，50年代在美国教学，她是普林斯顿大学任命的首位女性正教授。

讲述这样一位不算家喻户晓的故事，是不容易的。

影片没有采用通常传记片的做法——浓缩叙事，即把人物一生中大名鼎鼎的事件描摹一遍，再辅以交叉蒙太奇渲染情绪，俘虏观众的判断，这是大多数名人传记片的拍法。

然而，这部德国电影充满批判的内涵，没有采取万花筒式的结构，而是客观坦率地再现与发现阿伦特对纳粹“死刑执行官”艾希曼的庭审观察，写就《艾希曼在耶路撒冷》后处于舆论风暴中的种种。

她的视角超越了犹太民族，也挑战了同胞们的情感认同。

拥有浩瀚哲学星空中最亮的那几颗星辰，德国思想界的严谨思辨传统对后世的影响一直都在。

本片绝不止于呈现这个极具话题和学术造诣的女哲学家个体，更意在表现犹太民族面对劫难的反思和质疑，回忆同胞逝去的扼腕和痛楚。

正是在一片民族阵痛中，阿伦特的警醒与思考显得振聋发聩。

她看到了一种“平庸的恶”，个体在纳粹极权政治下的麻木和不思考，人们犹如机器一般附庸作恶。

这种恶平庸又日常化，导致艾希曼一次次执行屠杀命令正是这种“平庸的恶”。

片尾，阿伦特的好友、同事、邻居、亲人，因为她高高在上的哲人姿态离她而去，她孤独地站在窗边自言自语道：他们都没有意识到，正是这种平庸的恶汇聚起激进的力量，造成了我们的不幸。

镜头转向阿伦特的哲学家丈夫，他揽过阿伦特的肩，问道：如果早知出版后会引发争议和批评，你还会出版吗？

阿伦特眉头一锁，说：我会。

阿伦特面对真理的诚实和勇气，并在此基础上坚持的公民精神，比他的老师兼恋人海德格尔走得更远。

作为基础存在论的弟子，阿伦特没有停留在海德格尔存在与此在的学说，而是将人的生命实践延伸为个体责任与政治生活的关系。

当中年的阿伦特每每陷入回忆中，一个象征性抚慰的画面就浮现了：少女阿伦特羞涩又好奇地站在海德格尔面前，提出质疑，海德格尔只说一句：思考是一份让人孤独的事业。

拍哲学家的传记片远比政客、科学家或是明星要难，常常会因为着力思维的快感与痛感显得晦涩艰深，而本片的两层叙事一张一弛。

一层用艾希曼庭审牵引，镜头在犹太幸存者之间平移。

庭外，阿伦特在耶路撒冷与挚友的对谈也外化为她的思索。

严谨的叙事推进，没有绕过任何重要的情节演进，直到阿伦特从堆积如山的资料和庭审录音里，找到了论点。

另一层有阿伦特的家人朋友们领着，带出她生活化的一面，话唠群戏像是在试探她的思维底线，当她和闺蜜、丈夫在一起时，每段台词和场景都透露着她本真的一面。

那些略带辩论味的形容词和对话，道出了一个女哲学家智性的叛逆和精致的淘气。

在与海德格尔重逢的中午，两人漫步在深秋的白桦林里，海德格尔再次表露爱意，又说教了一句：真正喜欢的东西，只出现在少年或是青年，就是所谓“爱在第一眼”。

玩笑间也有浓浓的形而上的腔调。

好在这腔调并不令人生厌，相反，也增添了本片的哲学意味。

作为一部传记片，高明之处在于没有刻意表现人物的拧巴和纠结，没有刻意把冲突和内心戏戏剧化，而是节奏稳健地只拍一个事件，毫不吝啬地沉溺着展示着她的思考，正如她主张的个体思考与伦理觉醒都是首要的。

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首先，汉娜作为一个待过集中营的犹太人，能够抛开自己的身份和经历去“理解”阿道夫·艾希曼，实在不是常人能做到的（当然，她自己也说了理解不等同于宽恕）。

我们在对待任何人事物的时候，都基于自己的立场，要抛弃自我的偏见是非常困难的事。

从这一点，就可以说她是伟大的。

第二，汉娜对”阿道夫·艾希曼“的评判。

她认为，他会犯下这样的行为，是因为失去了作为人的基本能力——思考。

他只是像做一件普通工作那样”高效、准确“的完成。

当党卫军在首长的指导下，完成第三帝国的伟大理想时。

他们都躲在这个庞大体系背后，机械地活着。

这个”伟大的目标，民族的崛起“就是保护个人丑陋和邪恶的最好屏障。

当众人犯罪时，个人就不会觉得那是犯罪。

当有一个高尚的理由撑腰时，屠杀和犯罪都成了”战斗“。

纳粹不是一个人，把犹太人送进毒气室的也不会是一个人。

我们是整个体系中微不足道的一点，但是就是这每一点的不作为、不反思而造就了整个纳粹。

每个人都有罪，当然你也可以说每个人都没有罪，因为他们只是执行而已，并不是出于自己的意愿。

所以，纳粹是邪恶的，是反人类的。

而参与其中的每一个人，都要为第三，如果说希特勒利用民族主义和复仇情绪煽动了整个民众，那么战后犹太人的仇恨心理何尝不是民族情绪的膨胀。

你是犹太人，就不应该为纳粹说话；你是犹太人，就应该仇恨纳粹；你是犹太人就应该爱以色列。

如果，你对以上问题提出疑义，那无疑你就是叛徒。

其实这些看似很有道理的话，其实根本就没有必然的关系。

生活是有惯性的，思维也有是一个固定模式。

社会根据我们的出身给了我们身份，然后我们就要做符合这个身份的事情。

对人、对事分类，有利于我们遵循固有的应对方法来应对人事。

只有大家都按照统一的规则去生活的时候，这个社会才是平衡的（不是和平），整个国家机器才能正常的运作下去。

任何试图打破的人，都将遭到攻击和打压。

所以，汉斯是从情感上和思维惯性上都是不能接受汉娜的思想。

舆论也是很难接受这种观点的，这和他们对纳粹的固有定义相差太远了。

不符合他们的民族情感。

所以，说到邪恶。

你可以认为，人人都有邪恶的一面，只是看有没有一个面具可以躲在后面，合理、高尚地施恶。

同时，我们都有善良的一面，这个世界上没有纯粹的好人和坏人。

善恶是相对的，好坏也是相对的，你站在不同的立场，依据不同的标准，评判同一件事时，是会有不同的结论。

汉娜的朋友汉斯在演讲后批评她以精英的视角傲慢、自以为是地批评犹太人。

她这种居高临下的态度是使很多人感到不快的原因。

汉斯这一批评是我认为对于汉娜的一个最大挑战，尽管她自己到结尾也没有意识到。

“人们不思考”。

这个指控太精英主义、自以为是了。

放到现在，发表这种言论的人估计被归类为该挨骂的公知。

我虽然也欣赏精英对自身的高要求，但对于划定精英与平民界限这一做法抱怀疑态度。

书如其人。

她《human condition》的argument透露着相同的精英主义气质。

讽刺的是，不思考的平民的反面---哲学家海德格尔---也不可避免地被卷入了纳粹的阴谋。

思考或不思考，受害与施害，两者都是无能为力的。

对此，阿伦特会如何回应呢？

汉娜·阿伦特与好友 前排：尼古拉·乔洛蒙蒂（左一），玛丽·麦卡锡（左二），罗伯特·洛威尔（左三）。

后排：海因里希·布吕歇（左一），阿伦特（左二），德怀特·麦克唐纳夫妇（左三左四） 汉娜·阿伦特为人所知，一方面主要是作为20世纪具有重要地位的思想家、政治理论家，另一方面便是其审判阿道夫·艾希曼时以哲学方式在《纽约客》上提出的“恶之平庸”概念。

传记电影《汉娜·阿伦特》以后者为主线，呈现了汉娜·阿伦特生活天翻地覆的变化。

而另外一条线描述了海德格尔与汉娜·阿伦特的情感历程，亦是电影的主题之一。

海德格尔在汉娜·阿伦特心目中思想之王的地位，从1925相识并坠入爱河到1933年纳粹上台后经历了剧烈的变化，暗示一位20世纪女性不断强大，寻找自我的人生历程。

电影中有这样一个片段，好友玛丽·麦卡锡问汉娜·阿伦特，海德格尔是不是她一生中的最爱。

阿伦特否定了。

当被问及海德格尔在她心目中的地位，阿伦特是这样说的: 有些事比人更重要。

"有些事"是什么事？

答案是:思考。

这便是海德格尔给阿伦特带来最宝贵的东西。

本文将着重探讨这一从"人"到"思考"的过程。

海德格尔这条线是由阿伦特书桌上的相册引入的。

第一次，青涩的阿伦特，在自习室中得到同为海德格尔学生汉斯的消息，老师海德格尔被任命为弗莱堡大学校长，并加入纳粹。

这是1933年，纳粹上台，也是海德格尔与阿伦特二人人生的转折点。

这是电影中与海德格尔第四次，也是最后一次出场的呼应。

第二次，当对阿道夫·艾希曼的审判词在阿伦特的脑中不断重复，回忆来到1925年，满心欢喜而又羞涩的阿伦特与海德格尔在办公室进行了第一次会晤，表达着自己的思考。

阿伦特此时着迷于海德格尔，她的一番表述，是对爱的渴望与对人生的恐惧共同交织的结果。

对于一见倾心于阿伦特的海德格尔来说，他成为了阿伦特的爱人，保护者，指引她前进的导师。

第三次，当阿伦特面临挚友汉斯的强烈反对与丈夫身体每况愈下，一根烟把她的思绪带回了1924年海德格尔的课堂。

海德格尔对年轻阿伦特的思考有着巨大的影响。

文章《艾希曼在耶路撒冷》在《纽约客》发表以后引起了轩然大波，甚至还有每天不断的恐吓信和批评信，阿伦特不得不一人搬到乡下独自居住。

第四次，时间回到1955年，在美国已凭借《极权主义的起源》有所成就的阿伦特回到德国，而海德格尔则十分落魄。

在谈话中，海德格尔回忆了他们的美好相遇和热烈的爱情。

阿伦特却质问海德格尔交出尊严，屈服于纳粹的原因。

即使他做着无用的辩解，声称"那些都是诽谤"，最后他还是妥协了。

即使在这之后二人的关系逐渐变好，这意味着海德格尔思想之王地位在阿伦特心中的彻底崩塌，阿伦特的思想之王，不再是海德格尔。

每一次插入海德格尔这条线之前，阿伦特都面对着艰难的，不同的境遇陷入了某种沉思，似乎每一次都在从对海德格尔的回忆汲取力量，但其实汲取的并非是她从海德格尔身上学到的思考能力。

海德格尔思想对阿伦特的影响，已经被构筑到阿伦特思想世界中，成为其中的一部分。

电影通过海德格尔四次出场所要表达的从"人"到"思考"的过程，早在阿伦特完成关于"恶之平庸"撰稿就已完成。

文章的发表时间是1961年，而汉娜当时时隔数十年与海德格尔再次相遇是在1950年。

1950年以后，二人的书信交往越来越频繁，虽说电影所展示的是海德格尔地位的崩塌，但是阿伦特在这之后对海德格尔表示出了越来越多的理解，甚至说二人的爱情火花重新燃起。

因此可以说，电影中陪伴阿伦特度过那段艰难时期，直到最后在大学课堂上发声为自己辩护的，并非海德格尔，而是"思考"。

电影结尾部分阿伦特在大学课堂上为自己发声，表达自己对思考的理解，与海德格尔那条线中阿伦特沉浸在海德格尔思考世界的一幕相呼应，也证明着阿伦特完成了自己"思想世界"的构建，其思想之王已不再是海德格尔，也并非汉娜·阿伦特自己，她的思想之王，就是思考本身。

我想起了钱穆的"我爱吾师，吾更爱真理"，但放在海德格尔与阿伦特的关系里，并不能很好地解释从"人"到"思考"的过程。

阿伦特的童年经历可以说是悲惨，早年失去父亲，1933年纳粹上台后学术生涯一时中断，不断流亡，遇到了后来的丈夫诗人、哲学家海因里希，二人侥幸逃离集中营，来到美国。

如上文所说，年轻时海德格尔之于阿伦特，是一种庇护，指引方向的灯塔。

阿伦特对自我存在的认同也是在二人爱情中不断确立起来的。

阿伦特并非一开始就怀有成为自己、世界思想之王的宏伟目标，而是人生的波折经历，与海德格尔感情的起伏，包括海德格尔对阿伦特的"背叛"，促使阿伦特不得不孤身一身面对黑暗，尝试着构建自己的思想世界。

从某种程度上，《汉娜·阿伦特》对学术领域海德格尔与汉娜·阿伦特的研究有一定的启发，对其关系更深刻的认识，有助于更好地了解汉娜·阿伦特思想体系的构建。

这不禁让人联想到存在主义情侣萨特和波伏娃，更多深入的研究说明，波伏娃并非像过往人们想象的那样是作为男性一方萨特哲学思想的附庸，也颠覆了人们对女性哲学家的认知。

同为二十世纪的伟大女性，汉娜·阿伦特和波伏娃都展现了女性社会地位如何变化，尤其在思想和学术层面，而在今天，随着对这些伟大女性作家著作的关注、阐释不断增加，像波伏娃-萨特，阿伦特-海德格尔这类研究领域会起着更加重要的作用。

电影最后，阿伦特躺在床上，吸着烟，继续思考，因为事情还远没有结束，他还要面对犹太人潮水般的指责，诋毁和威胁。

好在汉娜·阿伦特已经是一个思想之王。

电影截图:阿伦特躺在床上思考

“平庸之恶”是成立的，在巨大的时代裹挟下，大部分人都只是其中的一根羽毛，风往西吹，它便朝西，风往东吹，它便朝东。

有些羽毛扎根于土，不愿受其摆弄，便被狂风折断。

在一切都风平浪静之时，人们开始追究那阵狂风中的每一根羽毛，认为其罪大恶极，是正义的对立面。

但非善即恶在这个世界是不成立的，即便大部分人都这么认为，去除思考，将其行为定义为绝对的天性的恶，而忽略时代狂风的吹动力，这是一种思考的惰性，这也是大部分人的惰性，于是人们对于艾希曼的绞死判决欢呼鼓舞，坚信正义由此得到声张，这是扎根于“思考之大地”的哲人们所不能接受的。

惩罚其所作所为，固然合理，但放弃思考，将一切归于本性之恶，就是对人类思想的亵渎。

这个审判可以定义为那段历史的审判，而不是个人的审判。

当民族主义泛滥，以恶治恶，以满脑子的愤怒去对待迫害者，这在某种意义上，像极了当初的迫害者，同样是民族情绪高昂，同样使用暴力，同样是大众失智，集体放弃思考。

这是不是同样的“平庸之恶”？

因为正读《过去和未来之间》，接触到用繁复严谨构造的文字描绘出逻辑思想流动的模样，觉得自己像一叶扁舟从怡情的小说文章小河误入了哲学思辨大江，懵懂间勉强把握着书中高阶思想的动向。

因此想从同名人物电影中了解这么一位非凡睿智的哲学学者，或许对我了解汉娜阿伦特和读好手头这本书都有进益。

为了避免给人带来哲学思想者智慧近乎冷酷的印象，电影表现了阿伦特家庭生活的甜蜜，和作为教授备受同僚学生的尊敬，并用许多细节塑造人物的纤细和修养。

以此推翻电影里许多人包括她的犹太同胞对她的高等知识分子的理智进行指控。

因为她没有从民族情绪作为出发点去对纳粹分子阿道夫·艾希曼进行无情的道德指控，而是从人性上分析德国人当时的精神都属于一种盲目崇拜元首，思考的无能状况，以此为世人需要保持独立思考才免予重蹈覆辙的警惕。

并从犹太人在应对欧洲各国生存态度上提出了建议，从而招致所有犹太人的勃然大怒：他们居然要为降临在自身的灭绝性灾难上反省自己的错误！

哲学并不是具有同情和立场的思考模式，哲学没有国籍民族之区分，它应该是一种人类高阶意识的共协，灵超越了肉。

而世人则困囿与自身的尊严或者常识，以自己的绝对立场拒绝认同“他人的不合情理的观点”。

这在阿伦特那里是付之阙如的东西，“除了自己的朋友，我没有爱过自己的民族。

”听起来很冷酷，其实作为一个哲学初心者也是完全可以get到的，这是接近“真理”必要的条件。

阿伦特提出一种“平庸的恶”，观点正中我心。

因为在看电影的当时，正打开的聊天窗口里，许多人正在对人道清洗穆斯林、印度阿三用手吃饭的低劣，日本人是天朝人和虾夷人杂交产物等话题津津乐道。

思考所表现出来的，不是知识，而是分辨是非的能力，判断美丑的能力。

而这些随从性的言论正暴露出天朝人身上的缺乏良知判断的“平庸之恶”。

这种思考的无能，为犯下规模庞大的犯罪行为，奠定了比人性自私更为邪恶的基础。

集权如纳粹的恶，并不是个别具有野心的人可以制造出来的，它生长在平庸之恶泛滥的温床上。

“雪崩时没有一片雪花觉得自己有责任。

”人类悲剧的思考无能性，正预示着新的雪崩的覆灭。

影片所讲述的不是阿伦特的生平，而是她人生中一个重大的事件，《艾希曼在耶路撒冷》的出版，以及它带来的滔天争议，甚至似乎还导致了美国犹太人组织对她的绝罚令（据阿莫斯·埃隆，《艾希曼在耶路撒冷》前言）。

片中阿伦特旁听对阿道夫·艾希曼的审判后与她的犹太亲友讨论，提出：艾希曼不是反社会，甚至不是反犹分子、狂热分子，他只是一个普通人、平凡人，一个官僚（但他的行为或说罪行，一点都不普通）。

艾希曼并不觉得他犯下了起诉书上的罪行，他只是在遵循元首的命令，执行法律。

这就是著名的平庸之恶，放弃自己的思考与判断，服膺权威。

考虑到人类的认知特点就是尽可能节约认知能量，更倾向于用直觉主导的“快系统”做出快速的令自己舒适的结论，除非每个人都非常自警，否则这点难以避免，同样的事情有机会就会重演而每次的“艾希曼”都不觉得自己在做艾希曼。

因此平庸之恶是永不过时的议题且在现在这个时间尤为需要温习。

不过这里试图讨论的的是另一个角度，对面的角度，不是邪恶的参与者而是邪恶的批评者的角度。

在阿伦特对犹太亲友提出这个观点时，犹太亲友们十分愤怒，不能理解作为一个犹太人她怎么能说出这种话。

阿伦特与亲友们实际上是否进行过这场对话不得而知，但《艾》书出版后舆论对阿伦特的批评、一些亲友的断交是实实在在发生了的，这就是当时许多人的观点：阿伦特是在为纳粹辩护。

造成轰动后，大量的人（包括知识分子们）其实也并未阅读《艾》原文（“无法忍受读下去”），仅凭批评言论中对其观点的提炼就做出批评指责。

而事实上，阿伦特并未为艾希曼作辩护，她是提出了更深度的批判。

很多人不能接受的就是，做出了这种邪恶行为的人怎么会不是魔鬼，若非残酷、疯狂、仇恨犹太人之人，怎么会干出这种事——这种人怎么会是正常人，怎么会和【我们】一样？

但是邪恶到底长什么样？

今天我们普遍认为纳粹的容貌是邪恶的，但不要忘记我们是在它酿成了巨大惨剧而且战败被批判反思了多年后才回头看的，受事后聪明式偏差(hindsight bias)影响。

对是二战之前或者初期，一名普通的德国人或欧洲人，这种邪恶是否写在纳粹脸上？

在邪恶的普通讨论中，我们总把邪恶陌生化、刻板印象化，与我们自己与日常隔绝开来，这容易造成认知误区，让人直觉地以为邪恶浑身上下都散发着邪恶的气息，是特异的。

举个例子，一般发生了儿童失踪案，警方会先从其家长邻人等熟人开始调查，很多人会不理解：“这些人都是我们熟悉的好人啊” 但统计上大部分的儿童受侵害案，作案者都是熟人。

家长们教导儿童“不要和陌生人说话”，发生了案件大家忙着寻找一个面目阴险可疑的“坏人”，不会去注意自己熟悉的素行良好的人。

豆瓣前段时间流行一个书单，“疯狂的年代，清醒的极少数人如何渡过”，大意就是“我们正常人”如何在“狂热分子”中生存。

但我猜绝大多数看到这个书单的人都会觉得自己是“清醒的极少数人”，就算把书单给建立者本意里所指的那些“狂热分子”看，他们也会觉得自己是清醒的人。

怎么“极少数人”有那么多呢？

这就是我们的问题，我们太把邪恶当外人了，当成一个他者。

这样既不利于理解/了解邪恶，也不利于约束自己，阻止其发生。

艾希曼在我们每个人的心里，邪恶长着我们每个人的脸。

人是复杂的东西，想象中的那种纯粹出于邪恶目的、动机的恶其实是少的，你观察生活，邪恶多数时候仅仅出自于“好麻烦啊，我们走那条容易的路吧”，还往往栖身于对greater good、美好理想的追求中。

我觉得我能准确认出纳粹，当我看到一个gov有在履行它的职能维持社会的正常运转，看到它扶助贫困，身边不少人日子在政策扶植下好起来了，虽然有些我也觉得有错的毛病，但我又能看清问题背后的资源不足或者能力掣肘限制，那它不是邪恶的。

有人揭露它干了邪恶的事，但没道理呀，它不是邪恶的，没有理由做邪恶的事，那必然是恶毒污蔑。

↑ 这是很多人认为的“狂热分子”我认出了纳粹，它全身上下就散发着邪恶，我能数出许多罪状，狂热分子们觉得它不是，心中真是充满了恶毒，不然就是有利益。

↑ 这是很多人自认为的“清醒人”以上，有时候是两帮人（在无效沟通），也会是一个人对不同对象，字面意义非比喻义的一个人。

其中指代可以随意替换。

邪恶往往不是单一面目的狰狞的，也许一个主体有其他的优秀行为或有好的动机，但有一些事单从做法上就是邪恶，无论出于什么动机。

而自认为在正义一方的我，我很确定我真的是正义吗，如果下一次有种伟大的主张符合我的价值观呢，我会同意可以用“灵活的方法”打败“邪恶”来达成吗？

因此才会有被很多人认为“偏袒坏人”的程序正义，通往正义走的路是很重要的。

我们人类有着各种本身的限制：有限注意力、大量难以消除的认知偏差，人类社会还有着严重的信息不对称、行动的成本等等，种种因素让邪恶和正义并不那么清晰可辨。

邪恶是熟悉的舒服的，一点也不遥远和特别。

条条大路通邪恶，正义（if there is any）总在难的不爽快的那一边。

Arendt & Eichmann: The New TruthMark LillaHannah Arendta film by Margarethe von TrottaHannah Arendt: Ihr Denken veränderte die Welt [Hannah Arendt: Her Thought Changed the World]edited by Martin Wiebel, with a foreword by Franziska AugsteinMunich: Piper, 252 pp., €9.99 (paper)1.In The Drowned and the Saved, Primo Levi’s final book on his experiences at Auschwitz, he makes a wise remark about the difficulty of rendering judgment on history. The historian is pulled in two directions. He is obliged to gather and take into account all relevant material and perspectives; but he is also obliged to render the mass of material into a coherent object of thought and judgment:Without a profound simplification the world around us would be an infinite, undefined tangle that would defy our ability to orient ourselves and decide upon our actions…. We are compelled to reduce the knowable to a schema. lilla_1-112113-250.jpg Hannah Arendt Bluecher Literary TrustHannah Arendt and Mary McCarthy, Sicily, 1971Satisfying both imperatives is difficult under any circumstances, and with certain events may seem impossible. The Holocaust is one of those. Every advance in research that adds a new complication to our understanding of what happened on the Nazi side, or on the victims’, can potentially threaten our moral clarity about why it happened, obscuring the reality and fundamental inexplicability of anti-Semitic eliminationism. This is why Holocaust studies seems to swing back and forth with steady regularity, now trying to render justice to particulars (German soldiers as “ordinary men”), now trying to restore moral coherence (Hitler’s “willing executioners”).Among Primo Levi’s virtues as a writer on the Holocaust was his skill at finding the point of historical and moral equipoise, most remarkably in his famous chapter “The Gray Zone” in The Drowned and the Saved. It is not easy reading. Besides recounting the horrifying dilemmas and unspeakable cruelties imposed by the Nazis on their victims, he also gives an unvarnished account of the cruelties that privileged prisoners visited on weaker ones, and the compromises, large and small, some made to maintain those privileges and their lives. He describes how the struggle for prestige and recognition, inevitable in any human grouping, manifested itself even in the camps, producing “obscene or pathetic figures…whom it is indispensable to know if we want to know the human species.”Levi tells the story of Chaim Rumkowski, the vain, dictatorial Jewish elder of the Łódź ghetto who printed stamps with his portrait on them, commissioned hymns celebrating his greatness, and surveyed his domain from a horse-drawn carriage. Stories like these that others have told and others still have wished to bury are unwelcome complications. But Levi tells them without ever letting the reader lose sight of the clear, simple moral reality in which they took place. Yes, “we are all mirrored in Rumkowski, his ambiguity is ours, it is our second nature, we hybrids molded from clay and spirit.” But “I do not know, and it does not much interest me to know, whether in my depths there lurks a murderer, but I do know that I was a guiltless victim and I was not a murderer.”Two recent films by major European directors show just how difficult this point of equipoise is to find and maintain when dealing with the Final Solution. Margarethe von Trotta’s Hannah Arendt is a well-acted biopic on the controversy surrounding Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem and its place in her intellectual and personal life. Claude Lanzmann’s The Last of the Unjust is a documentary about Benjamin Murmelstein, the last Jewish elder of the Theresienstadt concentration camp, who was considered a traitor and Nazi collaborator by many of the camp’s inmates, and was the only elder in the entire system to have survived the war. The directors have very different styles and ambitions, which they have realized with very different degrees of success. But neither has managed to replicate Levi’s achievement.2.Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem was published fifty years ago, first as a series of articles in The New Yorker and then, a few months later, as a book. It’s hard to think of another work capable of setting off ferocious polemics a half-century after its publication. Research into the Nazi regime, its place in the history of anti-Semitism, the gestation of the Final Solution, and the functioning of the extermination machine has advanced well beyond Arendt, providing better answers to the questions she was among the first to address.In any normal field of historical research one would expect an early seminal work to receive recognition and a fair assessment, even if it now seems misguided. Yet that is only now starting to happen within the history profession, in works like Deborah Lipstadt’s judicious, accessible survey The Eichmann Trial (2011). As the strong reactions to von Trotta’s film indicate, though, the Arendt–Eichmann psychodrama continues in the wider world. Now as then critics focus on two arguments Arendt made, and on the fact that she made them in the same book.The first, and better known, was that although Adolf Eichmann was taken by many at the time to be the mastermind of the Final Solution, the trial revealed a weak, clueless, cliché-spewing bureaucrat who, according to Arendt, “never realized what he was doing,” an everyman caught up in an evolving bureaucratic program that began with forced emigration and only later ended with extermination as its goal. That one “cannot extract any diabolical or demonic profundity from Eichmann” did not, in her eyes, reduce his culpability. From the start Arendt defended his capture, trial, and execution, which were not universally applauded then, even by some prominent Jews and Jewish organizations.1 This her critics forget, or choose to forget. What they remember is that she portrayed Eichmann as a risible clown, not radically evil, and shifted attention from anti-Semitism to the faceless system in which he worked.Had Arendt written a book on what she called “the strange interdependence of thoughtlessness and evil” in modern bureaucratic society, it would have been read as a supplement, and partial revision, of what she said about “radical evil” in The Origins of Totalitarianism. No one would have been offended. But in Eichmann she made the unwise choice of hanging her thesis on the logistical “genius” of the Holocaust, whose character she tried to infer from court documents and a few glimpses of him in the bullet-proof glass docket in Jerusalem.To make matters worse, in the same book Arendt raised the sensitive issue of the part that Jewish leaders played in the humiliation and eventual extermination of their own people. These included the heads of the urban Jewish community organizations that facilitated forced emigration, expropriations, arrests, and deportations; and the heads of the Jewish councils the Nazis formed in the ghettos and camps to keep the inmate population in line. These men were understandably feared and resented even if they carried out their duties nobly, while those who abused their power, like Rumkowski, were loathed by survivors, who circulated disturbing stories about them after the war.There was little public awareness of these figures, though, until the Kasztner affair broke in the mid-1950s. Rudolph Kasztner was at that time an Israeli official, but during the war he had worked for a group in Budapest that helped European Jews get to Hungary, which was then unoccupied, and then tried to get them out after the German invasion in 1944. As thousands of Jews were being shipped daily to the gas chambers, Kasztner and his group entered into negotiations with the Nazis to see if some could be saved. After various plans to save large numbers failed, Kasztner persuaded Eichmann to accept a cash ransom and allow 1,600 Hungarian Jews to leave for Switzerland, many of them wealthy people who paid their way and others from his hometown and family.In 1953 a muckraking Israeli journalist claimed that Kasztner had secretly promised the Nazis not to tell other Jews about Auschwitz, trading a few lives for hundreds of thousands. Kastzner sued for libel but lost his case when it was revealed that he had written exculpatory letters to war tribunals for Nazis he had worked with in Hungary. Before his appeal could be heard Kastzner was assassinated in front of his Tel Aviv home, in circumstances that remain obscure to this day. He was posthumously acquitted.The cooperation of Jewish leaders and organizations with the Nazi hierarchy became more widely known through the Eichmann trial and the publication in 1961 of Raoul Hilberg’s monumental study, The Destruction of the European Jews, which Arendt relied on heavily without adequate attribution. Though Hilberg’s book is widely revered today, he was just as widely attacked after its publication by Jewish organizations and publications for emphasizing the leaders’ cooperation and the rarity of active resistance, which he attributed to habits of appeasement developed over centuries of persecution, an argument Bruno Bettelheim echoed a year later in his controversial article “Freedom From Ghetto Thinking.”So Hannah Arendt was not betraying any secrets when she discussed these issues in a scant dozen pages of her book; she was reporting on what came up at the trial and found herself in the middle of an ongoing, and very sensitive, polemic. But exercising her gift for the offending phrase, she also portrayed the Jewish leaders as self-deceived functionaries who “enjoyed their new power,” and she termed their actions “undoubtedly the darkest chapter of the whole dark story.”Perhaps by “dark” all she meant was especially awful and a sign of “the totality of the moral collapse the Nazis caused…not only among the persecutors but also among the victims.” But pulled out of context her phrases made it appear that she was equating doomed Jewish leaders with the “thoughtless” Eichmann, or even judging them more severely. In any case, the whole discussion, a small fraction of the book, was psychologically obtuse and made her monstrous in the eyes of many.And the response was ferocious, in Europe and the United States. Her now former friend Gershom Scholem sent Arendt a public letter complaining, rightly, about her “flippancy” and lack of moral imagination when discussing the Jewish leaders, and declared her to be lacking in “love of the Jewish people.” Siegfried Moses, a former friend and recently retired Israeli official, sent a letter “declaring war” on her and got the Council of Jews in Germany to publish a condemnation even before serialization of her book in The New Yorker was complete. (He then flew to Switzerland to try to persuade her to abandon the book project altogether.) The American Anti-Defamation League sent out a pamphlet titled Arendt Nonsense to book reviewers and rabbis across the country, urging them to condemn her and the New Yorker articles for giving succor to anti-Semites.And in the New York intellectual circles that had become her adoptive home, she became the focus of angry attention from friends who once admired her. At the controversy’s peak Dissent magazine organized a forum to discuss the work and invited Arendt (she declined), Hilberg, and their critics. Hundreds showed up and the evening quickly descended into a series of denunciations of Arendt, who was defended briefly only by Alfred Kazin, Daniel Bell, and a few others. Only when President Kennedy was assassinated in November did she finally escape the spotlight.3.This messy episode is the surprising focus of Margarethe von Trotta’s much-discussed new film. As von Trotta tells it, her original intention was to trace the arc of Arendt’s life as a whole, much as she did with Rosa Luxemburg in her award-winning biopic Rosa Luxemburg (1986), but found the material too unwieldy. And so she choose to limit herself to Arendt’s life in New York. As she says in the short German book on the film edited by Martin Wiebel, what interested her was not the ins and outs of the Eichmann case but rather Hannah and her friends. This seems an odd choice for a movie but makes sense in view of von Trotta’s other work. Her specialty is didactic feminist buddy movies—in fact, one might say that she’s been making the same film throughout her career. The story usually involves two women, either friends or sisters, one of them a visionary or pillar of strength, the other a jejune admirer, and follows the evolution of their relationship against a political backdrop.In her first solo directed work, The Second Awakening of Christa Klages (1978), a woman holds up a bank to save the child care center she works at, then gets help from a soldier’s wife who becomes her lover and goes into hiding with her. They end up in a rural Portuguese cooperative getting their consciousness raised, are expelled for lesbianism, and have other adventures before it all ends badly. Marianne and Juliane (1981) uses as its model the life of Gudrun Ensslin, a founding member of the Baader-Meinhof gang who committed suicide in her cell in 1977; the story follows the Gudrun character and her sister as their relationship develops from alienation to reconciliation, and ends in a display of sisterly solidarity that reaches beyond the grave.lilla_2-112113.jpg Bettmann/CorbisAdolf Eichmann with Israeli police at his trial in Jerusalem, May 1962Von Trotta’s Vision (1991), which treats the life of the medieval mystic Hildegard von Bingen, is the most transparent example of the type. It portrays a courageous, enlightened woman prone to epiphanies who stays true to her visions and resists the church’s attempts to silence her. Along the way she develops a deep if unequal friendship with another nun, then another, provoking jealousy and misunderstanding, though it all works out in the end. She dies revered by those around her, though not by the powers that be.And this, more or less, is the story of Hannah Arendt. The film opens with a jovial Arendt (Barbara Sukowa) in conversation with her best friend Mary McCarthy (Janet McTeer), who in the movie is reduced to a hyperactive sidekick. They discuss men, they discuss love, they have a cocktail party with Arendt’s devoted if wayward husband Heinrich Blücher (Axel Milberg) and fellow New York intellectuals. Then they get news of Eichmann’s capture and the imminent trial. More drinks, more discussion, and then Arendt is off to Jerusalem, where she witnesses the trial mainly from the press room (where she could smoke) and visits an old Zionist friend.Von Trotta deftly intersperses clips from the actual trial into her film and shows Arendt watching them on closed-circuit television in the press room. This device allows her to stage a conversion scene. As the camera slowly zooms in on Arendt watching Eichmann testify, we see on her face the dawning realization that he was not a clever, bloodthirsty monster but an empty-headed fool caught up in an evil machine. She leaves Jerusalem, writes her articles, and all hell breaks loose in New York.It is not true, as some reviewers have charged, that the film portrays Arendt as flawless. Throughout she hears complaints about her tone, from friends like McCarthy and her New Yorker editor William Shawn. She is also challenged repeatedly by her close friend the philosopher Hans Jonas (Ulrich Noethen), who is given some of the best lines in the movie (some drawn from Scholem’s letter). Jonas rejected the very idea of “thoughtless” murder and criticized her for lacking psychological sympathy for fellow Jews trapped in the most horrifying circumstances imaginable. Still, by and large, her critics are portrayed as irrational, defensive Jews who, unlike Arendt, refuse to think about the uncomfortable complexities of the Nazi experience, whether out of shame or omertà.But although Arendt defends herself and the task of “thinking” deftly throughout the film, particularly in a fine public speech at the end, we don’t see her arriving at her position through thinking. Film can portray inner psychological states through speech and action and image, but lacks resources for conveying the dynamic process of weighing evidence, interpreting it, and considering alternatives. Barbara Sukowa smokes and rifles through documents and stares into space like a silent picture star, but we get no sense of the play of a mind. And so we are left with the impression that she, like Hildegard, has had a vision.And perhaps this is how von Trotta sees Arendt. She admits in the book by Wiebel that she, like many on the German left in the 1960s and 1970s, turned their noses up at Arendt for comparing communism and Nazism as instances of totalitarianism and refused to read her books. But later she came upon Elisabeth Young-Bruehl’s biography and discovered a strong figure, a female philosopher engaged in political debate whose personal life was also rich in friends and lovers. This woman she could admire and celebrate. The problem is that von Trotta has chosen an episode in Arendt’s life where the stakes were so high, intellectually and morally, that they cannot in good taste be treated as the backdrop of a human interest story. Though the battle may be lost, it can never be emphasized enough that the Holocaust is not an acceptable occasion for sentimental journeys. But here it’s made into one, which produces weird, cringe-inducing moments for the viewer.In one shot we are watching Eichmann testify or Arendt arguing about the nature of evil; in the next her husband is patting her behind as they cook dinner. When Blücher tries to leave one morning without kissing her, since “one should never disturb a great philosopher when they’re thinking,” she replies, “but they can’t think without kisses!” As for the short, incongruous scenes about her youthful affair with Martin Heidegger, the less said the better.The deepest problem with the film, though, is not tastelessness. It is truth. At first glance the movie appears to be about nothing but the truth, which Arendt defends against her blinkered, mainly male adversaries. But its real subject is remaining true to yourself, not to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. In her director’s statement on the film von Trotta says that “Arendt was a shining example of someone who remained true to her unique perspective on the world.” One can understand von Trotta’s reluctance to get into the details of the Eichmann case, let alone foreshadow what we know about it now, which would have violated the film’s integrity. But something else seems violated when a story celebrates a thinker’s courage in defending a position we now know to be utterly indefensible—as Arendt, were she alive, would have to concede.Since the Eichmann trial, and especially over the past fifteen years, a great body of evidence has accumulated about Eichmann’s intimate involvement in and influence over the Nazis’ strategy for expelling, then herding, and then exterminating Europe’s Jews. More damning still, we now have the original tapes that a Dutch Nazi sympathizer, Willem Sassen, made with Eichmann in Argentina in the 1950s, in which Eichmann delivers rambling monologues about his experience and his commitment to the extermination project. These have recently been collated and analyzed by the German scholar Bettina Stangneth, and the passages she quotes in her new book are chilling:The cautious bureaucrat, yeah, that was me…. But joined to this cautious bureaucrat was a fanatical fighter for the freedom of the Blut I descend from…. What’s good for my Volk is for me a holy command and holy law…. I must honestly tell you that had we…killed 10.3 million Jews I would be satisfied and would say, good, we’ve exterminated the enemy…. We would have completed the task for our Blut and our Volk and the freedom of nations had we exterminated the most cunning people in the world…. I’m also to blame that…the idea of a real, total elimination could not be fulfilled…. I was an inadequate man put in a position where, really, I could have and should have done more.2 In the end, Hannah Arendt has little to do with the Holocaust or even with Adolf Eichmann. It is a stilted, and very German, morality play about conformism and independence. Von Trotta’s generation (she was born in 1942) suffered the shock of learning in school about the Nazi experience and confronting their evasive parents at home, and in a sense they never recovered from it. (She convincingly dramatizes one of these angry dinner table confrontations in Marianne and Juliane.) Even today this generation has trouble seeing German society in any categories other than those of potential criminals, resisters, and silent bystanders.When left-wing radicalism was at its violent peak in the 1970s the following false syllogism became common wisdom: Nazi crimes were made possible by blind obedience to orders and social convention; therefore, anyone who still obeys rules and follows convention is complicit with Nazism, while anyone who rebels against them strikes a retrospective blow against Hitler. For the left in that period the Holocaust was not fundamentally about the Jews and hatred of Jews (in fact, anti-Semitism was common on the radical left). It was, narcissistically, about Germans’ relation to themselves and their unwillingness, in the extreme case, to think for themselves. Von Trotta’s Hannah Arendt shares that outlook.And so, in part, did Eichmann in Jerusalem. Reading the book afresh fifty years on, one begins to notice two different impulses at work in it. One is to do justice to all the factors and elements that contributed to the Final Solution and understand how they might have affected its functionaries and victims, in surprising and disturbing ways. In this Arendt was a pioneer; and, as Bettina Stangneth notes in her contribution to Martin Wiebel’s book, many of the things she was attacked for have become the scholarly consensus.But the other impulse, to find a schema that would render the horror comprehensible and make judgment possible, in the end led her astray. Arendt was not alone in being taken in by Eichmann and his many masks, but she was taken in. She judged him in light of her own intellectual preoccupations, inherited from Heidegger, with “authenticity,” the faceless crowd, society as a machine, and the importance of a kind of “thinking” that modern philosophy had abolished. Hers was, you might say, an overly complicated simplification. Closer to the truth was the simplification of Artur Sammler in his monologue on Hannah Arendt in Saul Bellow’s 1970 novel Mr. Sammler’s Planet:Politically, psychologically, the Germans had an idea of genius. The banality was only camouflage. What better way to get the curse out of murder than to make it look ordinary, boring, or trite?… There was a conspiracy against the sacredness of life. Banality is the adopted disguise of a very powerful will to abolish conscience. Is such a project trivial? Claude Lanzmann’s recent film The Last of the Unjust leaves no doubt about the answer to that question. At the center of it is a remarkable interview he conducted in 1975 with Benjamin Murmelstein, the Jewish elder of Theresienstadt who survived the war. Murmelstein worked closely with Eichmann for seven years and saw through his camouflaging techniques; he even witnessed Eichmann helping to destroy a Viennese synagogue on Kristallnacht. Yet Murmelstein was also a master of the gray zone, a survivor among survivors whose reputation was anything but pristine. Lanzmann’s film plunges us into that zone and reveals more than perhaps even he realizes.—This is the first of two articles.

《汉娜·阿伦特》是德国著名女导演冯·特罗塔的作品，也是她与芭芭拉·苏科瓦的再度合作。

她们两之前的合作也是传记类电影1986年的《罗莎·卢森堡》，这一次则是选择了二十世纪著名女哲学家汉娜·阿伦特。

影片并没有如传统传记类影片一样讲述汉娜的一生，而只是选取了汉娜生命中的一小段时光。

而这一小段时光可以说是汉娜人生中非常重要的时刻。

1961年，她主动向《纽约客》请缨对艾尔曼审判进行旁听，并据此写下文章供稿给《纽约客》。

这是这些文章或者说文章中她的观点将她推向了风口浪尖，不少人认为她在为犯罪者辩护，将过错怪罪到受害者头上。

昔日的同事好友都转身离去，汉娜并没有因此退让，反倒在往后岁月里不断思考“邪恶”这一主题。

1、汉娜的重要观点——平庸之恶汉娜亲自前往耶路撒冷，旁观了对艾尔曼的审判。

艾尔曼从头到尾都在否认对他的指控，他坚称自己不过是执行了命令而已。

当我们提起20世纪那段惨绝人寰的悲剧时，大多数人不由自主地将主谋们想象成邪恶的魔鬼，他们天性如此，杀戮成性。

艾尔曼的抗辩则揭露了另一种情况，假设他真的如他本人所说只是执行任务，那么他真的就无罪了吗？

汉娜认为，艾尔曼所犯下的罪恶恰恰是世界上最大的邪恶。

艾尔曼们完全交出了让我们人类区别于其他动物的重要特征，也就是思考的能力。

他对接到的命令不做判断，不假思索地加以执行，结果是犯下了规模庞大的罪恶行为。

他用服从命令为自己辩护，却忘了在作为体制内的一员之前他作为一个人人应该承担的责任和义务。

普通人对思考的无能和放弃也是一种邪恶，这就是汉娜所说的“平庸之恶”。

更有意思的一点是戴锦华老师的解读中提到的汉娜思想的有趣悖论。

汉娜师从著名哲学家海德格尔，后者被称为“思想之王”。

这是这么一个教给汉娜哲学思考方式的大哲学家，却曾支持甚至加盟了纳粹组织。

如果汉娜对于普通人的“平庸之恶”的观点成立的话，那又当如何解释海德格尔的行为呢？

2、汉娜被“网暴”的根源——我们是否失去了反思被害者责任的权利汉娜的文章出来后遭受了很多恶评，甚至昔日的同事、好友也都因此反对她、与她绝交。

虽然当时并没有互联网，但汉娜遭受的无疑是一场“网暴”。

这一切的起源不过在于，审判过程中提及了犹太人首领与纳粹的合作，汉娜同意反抗是不可能的，但是否有其他更好的做法。

这一观点被视为维护纳粹、仇视同族、鄙视自己的民族。

“网暴”汉娜的人的观点很好理解，他们认为，“在这样一个恶性事件里，你怎么能不和大家一样对加害人进行猛烈的抨击，你怎么还能说受害人也要承担责任呢”。

在他们看来，这里的规则很简单，只能是非黑即白，你只要有一点跟我们不同的声音那就是你在帮加害人说话。

他们中的绝大多数人甚至都没读过汉娜的文章，没有了解过她真正的观点，更别提对此进行思考了。

对此，汉娜的态度也很坚决。

首先她就表明，“这根本不是观点辩论，这是诬蔑人格”。

其次她指出，“试着理解并不等于原谅，我将理解视为我的职责，这是所有落笔这一主题的人的职责。

”

这一切与我们现在网路上看到的网暴事件何其相似。

我们需要反思的是，当恶性事件发生时，是否只有群起而攻之地指责加害人才是唯一被允许的声音？

对受害人行为的反思就是在帮加害人开脱或洗白吗？

冷静客观地思考并分析问题就意味着冷血和无情吗？

如果真的是这样，我们是不是也交出了自己独立思考的能力，犯下了如艾尔曼一样的“平庸之恶”呢？

3、汉娜的勇敢——直面伤痛，超越伤痛戴锦华老师说这部影片的主题和基调是勇敢的汉娜。

我想到的汉娜的勇敢是她在整个过程中直面各种攻击，坚持站出来表达自己的观点，从未因为亲友的反目而动摇过自己的立场。

在这样一场风暴中，做到这点确实需要极大的勇气和毅力。

我没有想到的是戴老师提及的另一个层面。

汉娜不仅是一位哲学家，更是一名德国犹太人。

她亲历了那段可怕的历史，也曾身陷集中营，是亲历者和幸存者。

她通过艾尔曼审判回顾和反思这段历史时，并没有让自己陷入受害者的感性情绪中，反而超越了个人的痛苦经历，用哲学方法思考这些问题。

勇敢者汉娜做到了这一点，仅这一点就值得敬佩。